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Several authors have argued that European integration is becoming characterised by a form of ‘new
intergovernmentalism’, with increasing numbers of decisions made through intergovernmental
forms of decision-making such as those in the European Council. Frank Schimmelfennig
assesses how accurate this perspective is. He argues that intergovernmental policy coordination of
the kind described by these authors is a far from novel phenomenon and originated in its present
form during the 1970s. As such the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ appears to be more about a speciﬁc
set of policies rather than European integration as a whole.
In a forthcoming article and edited volume on the EU, Christopher Bickerton, Dermot Hodson, and Uwe Puetter
argue in favour of a ‘new intergovernmentalism’, which characterises the essence of ‘European integration in the
Post-Maastricht Era’. I agree that the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ captures important aspects of institution-building
and decision-making in the EU but I disagree with the claim that it is the deﬁning – or even a novel – feature of the
post-Maastricht era. Actually, what they describe as the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ is more associated with the
nature of the integrated policies rather than the historical phases of European integration.
Is the post-Maastricht EU really predominantly
intergovernmental or at least more intergovernmental
than the pre-Maastricht era? To some extent,
Bickerton et al.’s positive answer depends on their
peculiar deﬁnitions of intergovernmentalism. First,
they argue that deliberation and consensus-seeking
have become characteristic of intergovernmental
relations and decision-making in the post-Maastricht
era. It is debatable how deliberative EU decision-
making is, but deliberation and consensus-seeking
have traditionally been attributes of supranationalism.
Second, Bickerton et al. limit supranationalism
arbitrarily to the “traditional supranational bodies”, the
Commission and the Court, and the traditional
Community method. They exclude the European
Parliament from the class of supranational bodies,
and invent the category “de novo bodies” to capture
the ECB, the ESM, the External Action Service, and
the plethora of agencies created since Maastricht. It is true that governments have been reluctant to empower the
Commission in the policy areas integrated since Maastricht. They delegated power to other supranational
institutions, however, that are not generally less autonomous than the Commission.
In fact, the “de novo bodies” display a wide variation of intergovernmental and supranational features, which makes
this term meaningless for an analysis of intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism. The ﬁnding that a new policy
like banking supervision has been delegated to the ECB rather than the Commission is certainly not a ﬁnding
against supranationalism. Even the Commission has gained additional competences over time in justice and home
aﬀairs, foreign policy, and economic policy.
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Moreover, Qualiﬁed Majority Voting – an attribute of supranationalism – is now the formal decision-making rule of the
Council in all but a few policy areas. In a concomitant development, the Parliament, hardly an intergovernmental
institution, has gained codecision rights in most areas of EU legislation and on the budget, and it has attained strong
inﬂuence on the appointment of the Commission and its President: i.e. in areas that have traditionally been the
domains of exclusive or predominant intergovernmental decision-making.
Intergovernmentalism is hardly new to the post-Maastricht era. Bickerton et al.’s claim that, “with the constitutional
framework unchanged, integration since Maastricht has been pursued via an intensiﬁcation of policy co-ordination
between Member States” could easily have been made by observers of the EC at the beginning of the 1980s – they
only would have needed to exchange “Maastricht” with “Rome”. The constitutional framework established by the
Treaties of Rome remained largely intact until the Single European Act; new policies have often been introduced
through intergovernmental policy coordination and cooperation.
Prime examples are the European Political Cooperation (1970), various forms of monetary policy cooperation from
the Monetary Committee (1958) and the “snake” of 1972 to the European Monetary System (1979), the TREVI anti-
terrorist intergovernmental network (1975), the beginnings of the regional policy (1975), and the Schengen
Agreement (1985) – all dominated by intensifying intergovernmental policy coordination both within and outside the
Treaty framework. The most intergovernmental of the EU institutions, the European Council, was established in
1974. Thus, intergovernmental policy coordination is not a phenomenon of the post-Maastricht era but originated in
the 1970s and was tied to the broadening of the scope of integration beyond commercial and regulatory policies into
core state powers, redistributive, and security-related areas.
Incidentally, most of these policies became institutionalised through the Treaty of Maastricht and afterwards
(Economic and Monetary Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Aﬀairs). While Bickerton
et al. rightly point out that member states did not fully transpose the traditional Community method to these new
areas, they are all governed less intergovernmentally now than in the pre-Maastricht era. And many policies that are
still comparatively intergovernmental (e.g. foreign and security policy, taxation policy, justice policy) have been
established before Maastricht. In sum, what is new in the post-Maastricht era is not the establishment of
intergovernmental policy coordination but its widespread communitarisation and supranationalisation.
It appears that the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ is about a speciﬁc set of policies rather than the EU as such or
historical phases of its development. Bickerton et al. refer to “new areas of EU activity” throughout the article but do
not theorise what distinguishes them from the “old areas”. A promising way forward is to conceptualise these “new
areas” by their strong relationship with “core state powers” closely linked to state sovereignty and national identity
(such as the national currency, the control of the external border, defence, internal security, the justice system, public
administration, taxation, welfare redistribution, and ﬁscal policy).
Similarly to Bickerton et al., the contributions to a recent volume edited by Philipp Genschel and Markus
Jachtenfuchs show that while European integration has come to encompass core state powers, the processes and
outcomes partly diverge from the integration of non-core state powers. Core state powers are likely to produce
sovereignty and identity costs for member state governments and societies, distributional conﬂict, and identity
politics in the domestic arena of member states. It is for these reasons that governments seek to limit supranational
centralisation and retain intergovernmental control at the EU level.
For a longer discussion of this topic, see the author’s article in the Journal of Common Market Studies
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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